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BOOTLEGGERS BEWARE: UNITED STATES V.
MARTIGNON UPHOLDS CONGRESSIONAL POWER
TO ENACT "COPYRIGHT-LIKE" LEGISLATION
THROUGH THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
Digital bootlegging is gaining national and international recognition
as one of the most serious problems facing the global music industry.'
While bootleggers have been illicitly copying various art forms for
hundreds of years, 2 digital technology has facilitated a widespread sys-
tem for creating and copying digital files.3 In the music recording in-
dustry, the unauthorized recording and distribution of musical
performances is a large subset of digital bootlegging and piracy.4
Bootlegs are essentially recordings of live music that the performer
never "intended to be commercially produced and made available to
the public."'5 In short, "bootlegging ... is theft."'6
1. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) estimates that in 2005
the amount of "pirated" CDs in the global marketplace was $4.5 billion, and twenty billion songs
were shared online. IFPI, THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 2006 PIRACY REPORT 4 (2006). http://
www.ifpi.org/content/library/piracy-report2006.pdf [hereinafter IFPI REPORT]. One study from
Los Angeles indicates that piracy of sound recordings cost the L.A. recording industry $851
million in 2005. GREGORY FREEMAN, NANCY D. SIDHU & MICHAEL MONTOYA, A FALSE BAR-
GAIN: THE Los ANGELES COUNTY ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS i
(2007), http://www.laedc.org/consulting/projects/2007-piracy-study.pdf [hereinafter L.A. RE-
PORT]. But see CLINTON HEYLIN, BOOTLEG! THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SECRET RECORDING
INDUSTRY 1, 3 (2004) (arguing that "bootlegs have been a positive influence on the music" and
that "bootleggers are the ultimate free-marketers, giving fans what they want-and to hell with
the wishes of the artist or recording company").
2. For a history of bootlegging from Shakespeare to the present day, see HEYLIN, supra note
1, at 13-21. For a brief history of the unauthorized (and, in some cases, authorized) bootlegging
in the past century, see Craig W. Mandell, Balance of Powers: Recognizing the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act's Anti-Bootlegging Provisions as a Constitutional Exercise of Congress's Com-
merce Clause Authority, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 673, 674-75 (2007).
3. See IFPI REPORT, supra note 1; L.A. REPORT, supra note 1.
4. In 1994, the year that Congress enacted the criminal anti-bootlegging statute, the music
industry lost $400 million to the unauthorized recording and copying of live performances. Todd
Patterson, The Uruguay Round's Anti-Bootlegging Provision: A Victory for Musical Artists and
Record Companies, 15 Wis. INT'L L.J. 371, 413 (citing David Yonke, Legalities Aside, Bootlegs
Booming, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 20, 1994, at 8D).
5. Id. at 373.
6. Brief for the United States of America at 6, United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d
Cir. 2007) (No. 04-5649-cr).
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While copyright law in the United States grants a specific bundle of
rights to authors, 7 U.S. law remains less protective of authors' rights
than many countries, especially with its limited acceptance of certain
international agreements. 8 In an attempt to unify the worldwide land-
scape for protection of authors' intellectual property rights, the inter-
national community came together to create several agreements,
including the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), signed at the end of the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 9 Specifically,
to comply with TRIPS, the United States enacted the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA),' 0 part criminal intellectual property legis-
lation to further protect authors' rights in America."' There have
been numerous constitutional challenges to the legislation that Con-
gress enacted pursuant to its international obligation, including those
statutes targeting bootlegging of audio and visual performances.' 2
The most recent constitutional challenge to Congress's criminal
anti-bootlegging statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, surfaced in United States
v. Martignon.'3 Defendant Jean Martignon was arrested and indicted
for selling bootlegged musical performances through a music store
and mail-order service.1 4 The district court, however, found that
neither the Copyright Clause, 15 nor the Commerce Clause,' 6 author-
ized Congress to enact the criminal statute. 17 On appeal, the Second
Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that even though Congress
could not enact § 2319A through the Copyright Clause, it could enact
the statute through the Commerce Clause.18
In United States v. Martignon, the Second Circuit resolved a poten-
tial conflict between the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.
7. See infra note 133.
8. See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01
(2008).
9. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
10. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); see infra
notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 53-141 and accompanying text.
13. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
14. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 3.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.").
16. Id. cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several states and with the Indian Tribes").
17. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492
F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
18. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 153.
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The decision is justified by the grave nature of the bootlegging prob-
lem, as well as United States' international obligations. Part II sets
the backdrop against which Martignon was decided, specifically exam-
ining the URAA, anti-bootlegging statutes, and other constitutional
challenges to anti-bootlegging statutes. 19 Part III summarizes Mar-
tignon and discusses its conclusion that § 2319A is not a copyright law,
but may be enacted through the Commerce Clause. 20 Part IV ana-
lyzes the Martignon opinion, examines relevant scholarly writings, and
concludes that the Second Circuit's reasoning is sound. 21 Finally, Part
V forecasts Martignon's impact on the landscape of copyright law and
the Commerce Clause power.22
II. BACKGROUND
This Part discusses Martignon's background. First, it draws on the
importance of the international obligations the United States under-
took in codifying the URAA.23 It then explains the substance and
development of § 2319A, the criminal anti-bootlegging statute that is
the subject of United States v. Martignon.24 Finally, this Part examines
constitutional challenges to anti-bootlegging statutes in other circuits
and sets the stage for Martignon by examining the interplay between
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.25
A. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act
The United States and other nations created consistent interna-
tional standards for various intellectual property rights through the
TRIPS agreement. 26 TRIPS imposed certain obligations on member
states, including standards for copyright, trademark, and patent pro-
tection.27 To comply with the TRIPS agreement, the U.S. Congress
implemented the URAA, which enacted into law the provisions
agreed upon at the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT.28 The
URAA, enforceable through the World Trade Organization (WTO),
19. See infra notes 23-72 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 73-141 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 142-261 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 262-275 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
26. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 108
Stat. 4809. 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
27. See id.
28. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 4.05[B][6] (noting that Congress enacted the
URAA as part of its obligations under TRIPS); see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
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was designed to increase U.S. compliance with certain norms of inter-
national copyright law, including criminal intellectual property
statutes.29
B. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A-Criminal Copyright Infringement
On December 8, 1994, Congress enacted section 513 of the URAA,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. Section 2319A imposes criminal penal-
ties on a person who infringes an author's copyright by recording and
distributing the author's live musical performances. 30 This section de-
scribes Congress's enactment of § 2319A, as well as the substance of
the law.31
1. Enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2319A
Congress was reluctant to impose criminal copyright sanctions as
recently as the 1980s, but as a result of advances in technology, Con-
gress established penal sanctions for some types of copyright infringe-
ment.32 By signing the TRIPS agreement and other international
agreements, the United States assumed obligations to enact legislation
to maintain compliance with those agreements. 33 Congress's obliga-
tion, then, was not to "formulate policy" or make findings as to intel-
lectual property crimes in the United States, but only to implement
legislation in accordance with the executive branch's international
commitments. 34
To this end, the legislation for the URAA was put on a "fast-track"
basis in Congress, which was unusua 3 5 and somewhat problematic. 36
29. Symposium, United States v. Martignon-Case in Controversy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223, 1225-26 (2006) [hereinafter Martignon Symposium] (citing
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26). International law imposes affirmative obligations upon the
United States, which materialized during the TRIPS agreement process:
This particular round of WTO agreements was noteworthy because it incorporated for
the first time protections for intellectual property and services, so that if one were
found to violate the obligations that the treaty imposed, then a recalcitrant country
could be taken to a WTO panel and have cross-sector retaliation imposed.
Id.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
31. See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
32. Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Mo-
rality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 736-37 (2003).
33. Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1226.
34. Id.
35. David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1407 (1995) ("Procedur-
ally, [the URAA's] most salient feature is that it was implemented on a fast-track basis."). The
URAA was also enacted by a "largely lame duck" Congress without a single revision. Id. at
1408.
36. See Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1227.
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The controversial fast-track process 37 did not allow Congress to
change or amend the legislation once it was introduced.38 In exchange
for the ability to enact legislation quickly, Congress gave up the power
to balance the interests and incentives of relevant parties. 39 Because
the URAA, like many other multinational international agreements, 40
was introduced as fast-track legislation, Congress was effectively una-
ble to give input in the formulation of the bill.4 ' Further, the criminal
anti-bootlegging section of the URAA was a small part of the 3000-
page bill that was introduced, and it was unlikely that Congress mem-
bers would vote against the URAA even if they disagreed with a small
segment of the overall bill.42 Thus, in 1994, Congress passed URAA
section 513, Criminal Penalties for Unauthorized Fixation of and Traf-
ficking in Sound Recordings and Music Videos or Live Musical Per-
formances, 43 which implemented criminal sanctions for bootlegging
musical performances in Title 18 of the United States Code.44
2. Consequences of Violating 18 U.S.C. § 2319A
A person violates § 2319A if she
without the consent of the performer or performers involved, know-
ingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain-
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical perform-
ance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or pho-
norecords of such a performance from an unauthorized fixation;
37. The term "fast-track" is also known as trade promotion authority. TRADE PROMOTION
AUTHORITY ANNOTATED, S. PRT. No. 110-10, at 1 (2007), available at http://finance.senate.gov/
TradePromotionAuthority.pdf.
38. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (1975).
39. Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1227 (discussing the phenomenon that treaty
obligations supersede Congress's ability to balance issues relating to the American public).
40. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 136 (2000) (noting that after the enactment of the Trade Act of
1974, most of the United States' multilateral international agreements were passed on a fast-
track basis).
41. Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1227 (William Patry, the drafter of § 2319A, dis-
cussed the difficulties of drafting a bill that Congress may not revise by stating: "you had to get
it right before the bill went in-not like ordinary bills, where you can hold hearings, you can
change it, you can listen to people, you can play with it .... That wasn't the case here. You
either got it right or you didn't.").
42. Id. ("There was no way anybody was going to vote against the bill based upon on [sic]
some intellectual property provision. As important as we may think intellectual property is, I
can tell you, in a 3,000-page trade bill, it doesn't mean diddly-squat.").
43. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 513, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000)).
44. Id. At the same time, Congress enacted a civil bootlegging statute in Title 17, which is
similar to § 2319A. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
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(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds
or sounds and images of a live musical performance; or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or
offers to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as
described in paragraph (1), regardless of whether the fixations
occurred in the United States .... 45
A convicted defendant faces several types of consequences for vio-
lation of § 2319A, including imprisonment and fines,46 as well as for-
feiture, seizure, and destruction of the infringing copies. 47 A
conviction under § 2319A will result in imprisonment of up to five
years in prison or a fine, as set out in Title 18.48 For subsequent viola-
tions of § 2319A, a defendant may receive a heightened prison sen-
tence of up to ten years or a greater fine.49
Courts may also order the forfeiture and destruction of any infring-
ing copies or phonorecords. 50 If the offense is severe, the court may
also order the destruction of any equipment that the defendant used
to create the copies or phonorecords. 51 Further, if the defendant in a
§ 2319A action created the unauthorized recordings outside the
United States, courts may order the seizure of those copies "in the
same manner as property imported in violation of the customs laws."52
C. Constitutional Challenges to Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
Since Congress enacted the civil and criminal anti-bootlegging stat-
utes in the 1990s, parties have brought several constitutional chal-
lenges in federal court. 53 Though federal district courts have reached
different conclusions regarding the constitutionality of anti-bootleg-
ging statutes, circuit courts have upheld the statutes as
constitutional. 54
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a).
46. Id.
47. § 2319A(b)-(c).
48. § 2319A(a).
49. Id.
50. § 2319A(b).
51. Id.
52. § 2319A(c).
53. See generally Dotan Oliar, Resolving Conflicts Among Congress's Powers Regarding Stat-
utes' Constitutionality: The Case of Anti-Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467
(2007).
54. See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., Inc.
(KISS 11), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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1. United States v. Moghadam
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard a constitu-
tional challenge to § 2319A in United States v. Moghadam.55 The de-
fendant was convicted of violating § 2319A after he pled guilty to
knowingly distributing, selling, and trafficking unauthorized CDs fea-
turing live musical performances of recording artists, such as Tori
Amos and the Beastie Boys. 5 6 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit as-
sumed that § 2319A could not satisfy the fixation requirement of the
Copyright Clause, but the court ruled that the statute had a sufficient
connection to interstate and foreign commerce to fall within Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 57
The Eleventh Circuit referred to the rights conferred by § 2319A as
"hybrid rights," which are similar to but separate from the typical
sticks in the copyright bundle of rights.5 8 Specifically, the court as-
sessed the fixation requirement of U.S. copyright law, though it did
not rule on Congress's power to enact § 2319A through the Copyright
Clause. 59 Instead, the court ruled that § 2319A may be enacted
through the Commerce Clause because it was rationally related to in-
terstate commerce. 60 The court referred to several Supreme Court
cases to support the idea that Congress may enact legislation through
the Commerce Clause. 61 According to the analysis of those cases, the
Moghadam court determined that Congress may enact "hybrid" legis-
lation through the Commerce Clause, even when it may not enact the
same legislation through otherwise relevant constitutional avenues,
such as the Copyright Clause. 62
55. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1269.
56. Id. at 1271.
57. Id. at 1282. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that although the term "Writings" in the Copy-
right Clause "allows Congress to extend copyright protection to a great many things, those things
have always involved some fixed, tangible durable form." Id. at 1274. Moghadam argued that a
live performance "has not been reduced to a tangible form or fixed as of the time of the per-
formance," and the Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the fixation concept of the
Copyright Clause does not extend to live performances that have not been reduced to a fixed
form. Id.
58. Id. at 1272-73.
59. Id. at 1274.
60. Id. at 1275-76 ("Section 2319A clearly prohibits conduct that has a substantial effect on
both commerce between the several states and commerce with foreign nations .... Moreover,
the type of conduct that Congress intended to regulate by passing the anti-bootlegging statute is
by its very nature economic activity.").
61. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277, 1279 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); The Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879); Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Second
Circuit in Martignon later referred to several of the cases cited in the Moghadam opinion. See
infra notes 104-124 and accompanying text.
62. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1282.
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2. The KISS Cases
Additionally, in Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport International Prod-
ucts, Inc.,63 a district court in the Central District of California ulti-
mately upheld the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 1101, the civil anti-
bootlegging statute.64 Initially, however, the district court ruled that
§ 1101 was unconstitutional because the limits contained in the Copy-
right Clause prohibit Congress from enacting legislation such as
§ 1101 through the Commerce Clause. 65 The district court reasoned
that the framers intended to limit Congress's power to enact copyright
laws, and that to allow "the current scope of the Commerce Clause to
overwhelm those limitations altogether would be akin to a 'repeal' of
a provision of the Constitution. '66 The court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons,67 the
"most instructive case on this issue."' 68 Citing Gibbons, the district
court wrote that the Supreme Court limits Congress's Article I, Sec-
tion 8 powers from subversion by the Commerce Clause. 69
However, the district court later vacated its opinion and sided with
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Moghadam.70 The court reversed its
earlier treatment of the Gibbons decision:
[T]he question is not whether legislation empowered by the Copy-
right Clause-but invalid under it-can otherwise be empowered by
the Commerce Clause. The question is whether matters not encom-
passed within the Copyright Clause can be addressed by the Com-
63. KISS 11, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005). For a more detailed discussion of the
KISS cases, see Angela T. Howe, United States v. Martignon & KISS Catalog v. Passport Inter-
national Products: The Anti-bootlegging Statute and the Collision of International Intellectual
Property Law and the United States Constitution, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2005).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000). The civil anti-bootlegging statute is substantially similar to its
criminal counterpart, except that the criminal statute requires that the defendant create the
bootlegs knowingly and for commercial gain. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
65. KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., Inc. (KISS 1), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (distinguishing the Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta, and other cases).
66. Id. at 836-37.
67. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
68. KISS 1, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 836. KISS I elaborated on the extent of the limits of the Copy-
right Clause:
The Railway Labor Court examined a clause, like the Copyright Clause, that both pro-
vides a positive grant of power and contains an express limit. In the instant case, al-
lowing Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause in a situation where the Copyright
Clause would otherwise be violated would "eradicate from the Constitution a limitation
on the power of Congress."
Id. at 836-37 (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 469).
69. KISS 1, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
70. KISS 11, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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merce Clause free of the restrictions of the Copyright Clause. The
answer to that question is, clearly, yes. 71
Thus, the district court ruled that the civil anti-bootlegging statute did
not offend the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to legislate
under the Commerce Clause. 72
III. SUBJECT OPINION: UNITED STATES V. MARTIGNON
The Second Circuit carefully analyzed the lower court's opinion in
Martignon by consulting various sources to classify § 2319A as either
copyright or commercial legislation. In examining the lower court's
holding and Martignon's appeal, the Second Circuit first focused on
whether the Copyright Clause limitations prevented Congress from
enacting § 2319A under the Commerce Clause.73 Then, to determine
the scope and limits of the Copyright Clause, the Second Circuit con-
sidered Supreme Court jurisprudence, as well as several approaches
detailing whether § 2319A could be classified as a copyright law.74 Fi-
nally, the Second Circuit elaborated on whether § 2319A might fall
under the Commerce Clause. 75
A. The District Court Holding and the
Second Circuit's Interpretation
In 2004, criminal defendant Jean Martignon challenged the constitu-
tionality of § 2319A in United States v. Martignon.76 Until 2003, Mar-
tignon operated a record business comprised of "a Manhattan store, a
catalog service, and an Internet site."' 77 The Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America (RIAA), in conjunction with law enforcement
agencies, investigated Martignon's business.78 In 2003, Martignon was
arrested and indicted in the Southern District Court of New York
under § 2319A for selling unauthorized sound recordings of live
concerts.
79
71. Id. at 1176.
72. Id. at 1177.
73. See infra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 100-134 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 135-141 and accompanying text.
76. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d
Cir. 2007).
77. Id. at 417.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court noted that the one-count indictment "provides no further details as to, e.g.,
the artists that Martignon allegedly bootlegged, the scope of the bootlegging, or the distribution
of bootlegged works." Id.
20081
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Martignon moved to dismiss the federal indictment, challenging the
constitutionality of § 2319A as enacted through the Copyright Clause
and arguing that § 2319A conflicted with the First Amendment. 80 The
United States admitted that § 2319A "was likely beyond Congres-
sional authority under the Copyright Clause" and urged the district
court to find that the statute was constitutional under the Commerce
Clause,81 as the Eleventh Circuit had in Moghadam.82 Instead, the
district court dismissed the case based on § 2319A's conflict with cop-
yright law.83 The district court first examined the legislative history of
§ 2319A.84 The court found that the extant history supported the clas-
sification of § 2319A as a copyright law because the TRIPS agreement
was meant to protect intellectual property rights, and also because the
statute was similar in definition and placement to other copyright leg-
islation. 5 However, despite its "copyright-like" nature, the district
court held that § 2319A was not validly enacted under the Copyright
Clause, because it gives rights to a performer that are unlimited in
time without requiring the performer to reduce his performance to a
fixed form.86
Further, the district court held that Congress could not enact such
"copyright-like" legislation through the Commerce Clause because
the conflict would violate the limitations imposed by the Copyright
Clause.87 To support this reasoning, the district court relied on Rail-
way Executives' Labor Ass'n v. Gibbons,88 in which the Supreme
Court struck down a bankruptcy law due to a constitutional conflict
with the Bankruptcy Clause and the Commerce Clause. 89 Therefore,
the district court invoked the constitutional doctrine that "Congress
may not do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly." 90 Based on
this reasoning, the district court dismissed the United States' claim
against Martignon. 91
80. Id. at 416-17.
81. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 4.
82. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999).
83. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 429-30.
84. Id. at 417-18.
85. Id. at 418.
86. Id. at 424.
87. Id. at 424-25.
88. Id. at 420 (citing Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982)).
89. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 465.
90. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
91. Id. at 429. The district court did not consider the First Amendment issue because it had
already found through its Copyright and Commerce Clause analysis that the indictment could
not stand. Id. at 429 n.22.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the limited question of
"the extent to which Congress can use one of its powers to enact a
statute that it could not enact under another of its arguably relevant
powers. '92 The court noted the lower court's four reasons for classify-
ing § 2319A as a copyright law: (1) the TRIPS agreement was "in-
tended to protect intellectual property; ' 93 (2) § 2319A's language is
"consistent with the purpose of the Copyright Clause, encouraging au-
thors and inventors to create by granting them exclusive rights in their
writings and discoveries; '94 (3) the Committee on the Judiciary's re-
port describes § 2319A "in terms of copyright and contains no men-
tion of commerce; ' 95 and (4) § 2319A immediately follows the
criminal copyright provision and "refers to the definitions in Title 17,
the copyright title of the United States Code. ' 96 The Second Circuit
also noted the district court's conclusion that Congress did not have
the power to enact § 2319A through the Copyright Clause because the
provision granted "seemingly perpetual" protection to musical per-
formances, violating the limitation requirement of the Copyright
Clause. 97
Finally, the Second Circuit noted the district court's conclusion that
Congress could not enact § 2319A through the Commerce Clause; the
lower court held that "Congress may not, if the Copyright Clause does
not allow for such legislation, enact the law under a separate grant of
power, even when that separate grant provides proper authority." 98
However, the Second Circuit remarked that such reasoning stood in
direct conflict with United States v. Moghadam, the only other circuit
decision regarding the constitutionality of § 2319A.99
B. The Second Circuit's Analysis of the Scope and Limits
of the Copyright Clause
Because the government conceded that Congress did not have the
authority to enact § 2319A under the Copyright Clause, the court fo-
cused on whether the Copyright Clause imposed limitations on Con-
92. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 2007).
93. Id. at 143 (citing Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 421).
96. Id. at 143 (citing Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 421-22).
97. Id. at 143-44 (citing Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24).
98. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 144 (citing Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425).
99. Id. at 144 n.3 (citing United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)). While
circuits may determine the same issue differently, the Second Circuit mentioned the district
court's disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit's Moghadam decision to emphasize the paucity
of litigation regarding § 2319A, as well as the district court's stark disapproval of Moghadam.
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gress's ability to enact § 2319A through the Commerce Clause. 00 The
court noted that the Copyright Clause grants power to Congress and
imposes limitations upon that power, but that the text of the clause is
unclear about delineating "where the grant of power ends and where
the limitation(s) begin(s)."'' First, the Second Circuit looked to Su-
preme Court jurisprudence regarding Congress's ability to pass legis-
lation through the Commerce Clause.102 Then, drawing from
Supreme Court cases, the Second Circuit entertained several possible
approaches to determine whether the Copyright Clause limited Con-
gress's ability to enact § 2319A through the Commerce Clause. 0 3
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The Second Circuit began its analysis of the scope and limits of the
Copyright Clause by examining past Supreme Court cases that dealt
with Congress's power to enact legislation under the color of one con-
stitutional provision that it could not enact through another. 0 4 Spe-
cifically, the court discussed the Trade-Mark Cases,0 5 Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,106 and Railway Executives' Labor Ass'n v.
Gibbons.'0 7
In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court determined that a
criminal trademark law could not be enacted through the Copyright
Clause or the Commerce Clause because the law did not require that
the work be original or that the activities affect interstate com-
merce. 108 While the Supreme Court struck down the law in the Trade-
Mark Cases, the Second Circuit highlighted the Court's analysis to
100. Id. at 144.
101. Id. at 145.
102. See infra notes 104-124 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 125-134 and accompanying text.
104. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 145-49.
105. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that a criminal statute pertaining to
trademark infringement was unconstitutional because the Commerce Clause did not authorize
Congress to pass legislation regulating the registration of trademarks that are not used in inter-
state commerce).
106. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that the Com-
merce Clause authorized Congress to prohibit intrastate, local activities that discriminated on
the basis of race, so long as the activity affected interstate commerce).
107. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that a bankruptcy
law violated the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause because the law did not uniformly apply to a
defined class of debtors).
108. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94, 97-98). At least
one scholar points out that the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Trade-Mark Cases "implicitly
endorsed" the idea that "legislative powers granted to Congress by the Constitution are not
mutually exclusive but operate instead as alternative lawmaking authorities" when it "hinted
that although federal trademark legislation could not be adopted under the Copyright Clause, it
might be valid under the Commerce Clause." Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking
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support the idea that if Congress may not enact a law through the
Copyright Clause, it still may enact the same law through the Com-
merce Clause, so long as the law is related to interstate commerce. 10 9
Additionally, the court noted that "[t]rademark legislation has long
since been upheld as an exercise of Commerce Clause power even
where a defendant uses its mark only in intrastate commerce. u t°
In Heart of Atlanta, the Supreme Court heard a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,111 which Congress enacted
under its Commerce Clause powers in an effort to eradicate racial
discrimination by private parties.1 12 The Martignon court noted that
in Heart of Atlanta, the Supreme Court upheld Title II of the Civil
Rights Act because racial discrimination has a negative effect upon
interstate commerce, giving Congress the power to enact the statute
under the Commerce Clause.113 From Heart of Atlanta, the Second
Circuit drew "the not surprising conclusion that if a statute is outside
even the most generalized interpretation of the scope of the Copyright
Clause, i.e., it is not a copyright law, it can be regulated under the
Commerce Clause. '114
Finally, in Gibbons, the Supreme Court struck down a bankruptcy
law, Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act
(RITA),115 which the Court determined could not have been enacted
through the Bankruptcy Clause or the Commerce Clause. 116 Specifi-
cally, the Gibbons Court dismissed the idea that bankruptcy laws that
could not comport with the Bankruptcy Clause could be enacted
through the Commerce Clause." 7 While the Second Circuit acknowl-
Authority: An (Inter)Nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355,
357 (2007).
109. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94, 97-98).
110. Id. at 146 n.4 (citing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d
Cir. 1959)).
111. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. The Supreme Court previously
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discrimination by state actors. The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
112. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245-50 (1964).
113. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 147 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257). The Martignon
court placed great deference on congressional findings that an activity affects interstate com-
merce, especially when lawmaking determinations were as narrowly tailored as they were in
Heart of Atlanta. Id.
114. Id.
115. Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1001 (1980).
RITA provides for payments to employees in the event that railway carriers go out of business or
reorganize under bankruptcy laws. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457,
459-63 (1982).
116. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 148-49 (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 465, 468-75).
117. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468-69. Because bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the
United States, the Gibbons Court reasoned that "if we were to hold that Congress had the power
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edged that Martignon relied heavily on Gibbons,n8 it discounted the
applicability of Gibbons to the facts at hand. 119 The court distin-
guished Martignon from Gibbons in one key aspect, namely, that Gib-
bons focused on categorizing the law as a bankruptcy law, which
should be enacted through the Bankruptcy Clause, or commercial reg-
ulation, which should be enacted through the Commerce Clause. 120 If
the law was a bankruptcy law, it should be enacted through the Bank-
ruptcy Clause; if it was a commercial regulation, it should be enacted
through the Commerce Clause. 121 The Second Circuit encouraged a
narrow reading of Gibbons:
The Gibbons Court considered primarily what RITA did, not Con-
gress's belief as to which clause authorized its action. RITA man-
dated that an existing bankruptcy proceeding be handled differently
from any other bankruptcy in the United States. It also altered the
statutory priorities for paying debts and the administrative scheme
contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code. It was a bankruptcy law. 122
After reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to the Copy-
right Clause and its relation to the Commerce Clause, the Second Cir-
cuit found that "the Supreme Court's cases allow the regulation of
matters that could not be regulated under the Copyright Clause in a
manner arguably inconsistent with that clause unless the statute at is-
sue is a copyright law."'1 23 Though the court declined to elaborate on
the full scope of the Copyright Clause, the court concluded "that Con-
gress exceeds its power under the Commerce Clause by transgressing
limitations of the Copyright Clause only when (1) the law it enacts is
an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright Clause
and (2) the resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the
Copyright Clause.' 24
2. Section 2319A as a Copyright Law
The Second Circuit next considered whether § 2319A could accu-
rately be characterized as a copyright law, regardless of whether Con-
to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate
from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws." Id.
118. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 148. Incidentally, the Second Circuit also noted that "Gibbons is
the only case called to our attention by the parties or the amici in which the Supreme Court
struck down a statute that violated the limitation of one constitutional provision despite its clear
nexus to another provision." Id. at 149.
119. Id. at 149.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Martignon, 429 F.3d at 149.
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gress could enact the provision through the Commerce Clause.1 25 To
decide whether § 2319A is a copyright law, the Second Circuit re-
turned to its earlier treatment of the Gibbons case. 126 Under the Gib-
bons standard, the court declared that "in order to demonstrate
unconstitutionality, Martignon must establish that Section 2319A is a
copyright law and not just that it is copyright-like. '127
The Second Circuit defined two approaches to determine whether
§ 2319A could be termed copyright legislation.128 The court first de-
fined the "textualist" approach, under which a court must determine
whether a law is a copyright law by examining whether it creates, be-
stows, or allocates rights to copyright holders.129 Under the textualist
approach, the court found that § 2319A is not a copyright law because
it does not create, bestow, or allocate rights to copyright holders.1 30
The Second Circuit then considered the history and context approach,
under which a court decides whether a law is a copyright law based on
the premise that copyright laws historically have allocated property
rights to copyright holders.131 Under the history and context ap-
proach, the court also determined that § 2319A does not grant prop-
erty rights to copyright holders.1 32 Instead, § 2319A is a criminal
statute that grants only one right to copyright holders-the right of
fixation-which is not a sufficient nexus to copyright law and the ex-
tensive bundle of rights granted to copyright owners. 133 Thus, the Sec-
125. Id. at 149-50.
126. Id. at 150.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 151. By "copyright law," the Second Circuit referred to rights granted to copyright
owners:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ond Circuit determined that § 2319A cannot be characterized as a
copyright law.134
C. Commerce Clause Authority
Having determined that the lower court was correct in reasoning
that Congress could not enact § 2319A pursuant to the Copyright
Clause, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether Congress
had the authority to enact § 2319A pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.135 The court established the required level of scrutiny to de-
termine whether a statute may be enacted through the Commerce
Clause: a court may only strike down a law enacted through the Com-
merce Clause if the law has no rational basis or rational relationship
to the regulated activity.136 The court noted that § 2319A regulates
fixing, selling, distributing, and copying with a commercial motive,
which are "activities at the core of the Commerce Clause. ' 137 Fur-
ther, the court noted the strong nexus between bootlegging and com-
merce: the thriving underground bootlegging market affects the
music industry's ability to sell records and promote concerts. 138 Thus,
the court reasoned that there was a rational basis for a congressional
finding that bootlegging affects interstate commerce. 139
Ultimately, the court determined that Congress had the constitu-
tional authority to enact § 2319A pursuant to the Commerce Clause
and vacated the dismissal of the indictment against Martignon. 140
Under the Second Circuit's ruling, Congress may enact copyright leg-
islation through the Commerce Clause, so long as (1) the legislation is
not in direct conflict with limitations of the Copyright Clause, and (2)
the regulated activity has a minimally rational effect on interstate
commerce.
1 41
134. Id.
135. Id. at 152-53.
136. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152-53 (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 754 (1982)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. On the issue of the potential conflict of § 2319A with the First Amendment, the court
remanded to the district court for determination. Id. Incidentally, Martignon had twenty-nine
intellectual property and constitutional law professors on his side as amici curiae, indicating
strong arguments on the issue for remand. See id.; Brief for Twenty-Nine Intellectual Property
and Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, United
States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 04-5649-cr).
141. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150-53.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Martignon reflects the judicial trend of upholding Congress's power
to enact anti-bootlegging legislation through the Commerce Clause.t142
This position contradicts the majority of scholarly opinions and sev-
eral district court decisions. 143 This Part analyzes the Second Circuit's
opinion in Martignon and considers the Second Circuit's description
of precedent and its treatment of counterarguments. 144 This Part then
examines normative considerations for Martignon, including those not
addressed by the court.1 45 Ultimately, this Part concludes that the
Second Circuit's holding was correct.
A. The Second Circuit's Treatment of the District Court Opinion
In analyzing the Martignon facts, the Second Circuit assessed con-
stitutional precedent, as well as the reasoning of each party.146 This
Section discusses the Second Circuit's treatment of precedent, the
lower court's opinion, and counterarguments raised by amici curiae. 147
1. Description of Precedent
Considering the scope and limits of the Copyright Clause, the Sec-
ond Circuit adeptly drew on precedent and rejected Martignon's
view.' 48 The court's analysis primarily focused on the Trade-Mark
Cases,t49 Heart of Atlanta,1 50 and Gibbons.151 In examining these
three cases, the Second Circuit outlined its argument that "Congress
can sometimes enact legislation under one constitutional provision
that it could not have enacted under another. ' 152 In general, the Sec-
142. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
143. Richard B. Graves Ill, Globalization, Treaty Powers, and the Limits of the Intellectual
Property Clause, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 199, 218 n.119 (2003) (listing scholarly authorities
in line with the idea that Congress may not legislate around the Copyright Clause through the
Commerce Clause). But see Patterson, supra note 4, at 373 (examining the history of modern
bootlegging and determining that the new "tools" for artists in the Uruguay Round provisions
are just, though not perfect, solutions to protecting artists' rights).
144. See infra notes 146-242 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 243-261 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 76-141 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 148-242 and accompanying text.
148. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 145-53 (2d Cir. 2007). Most of the cases dis-
cussed by the Second Circuit were also cited by other courts in cases that considered the consti-
tutionality of anti-bootlegging statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269
(11th Cir. 1999).
149. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
150. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
151. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
152. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 260-61).
2008]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ond Circuit successfully supported its broad view of the commerce
power. 53
The Second Circuit began its analysis with the Trade-Mark Cases.154
Although that case found that criminal trademark legislation was not
authorized under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce
Clause, the Second Circuit extracted the underlying analytical frame-
work to apply to Martignon.155 In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court
first analyzed the criminal trademark statute under the Copyright
Clause; after finding that the statute was invalid under that clause, the
Court next considered the Commerce Clause. 156 This closely follows
the Second Circuit's analysis in Martignon, which rejected the lower
court's opinion that limitations of the Copyright Clause precluded
Congress from enacting § 2319A through any other constitutional ve-
hicle.' 57 Another Supreme Court case, United States v. Raines,158 indi-
cated that courts are rarely "able confidently to discern that Congress
would not have desired its legislation to stand at all unless it could
validly stand in its every application. ' 159 Most persuasively, the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that at the time of the Trade-Mark Cases, the
Supreme Court had a "limited view" of the Commerce Clause.' 60 The
court revealed that since the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court
has taken a much broader view of the Commerce Clause, and courts
have long upheld trademark legislation as a valid exercise of the Com-
merce Clause power. 161
There are certainly those who argue that the Second Circuit's as-
sessment of the Trade-Mark Cases was entirely wrong. From the
Trade-Mark Cases, the Second Circuit draws the "not surprising con-
clusion" that Congress may enact a statute under the Commerce
153. Since 1937, the Supreme Court has embraced a broad view of the commerce power,
which has been put into question since 1995. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§ 3.3.4, 3.3.5 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the tug-of-war between liberal
and conservative justices regarding the level of review for the regulation of interstate commer-
cial activity); see infra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
154. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146.
155. Id. at 146.
156. Id. (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1879)).
157. Id. at 143-44. In Lord v. S.S. Co., the Supreme Court followed the Trade-Mark Cases,
but the Court upheld an admiralty law because the law required that the regulated activity affect
interstate commerce. Lord v. S.S. Co., 102 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1881).
158. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
159. Id. at 23.
160. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 n.4. The period between the Civil War and 1887 saw few
cases challenging Congress's Commerce Clause Power, and those that were decided were largely
inconsistent. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, § 3.3.3.
161. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 n.4 (citing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959)).
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Clause even if it is "outside even the most generalized interpretation
of the scope of the Copyright Clause, i.e., it is not a copyright law."
162
At least one federal district court opinion, Kelley v. Great Northern
Railway Co., interpreted the Trade-Mark Cases as strictly limiting
Congress's power to enact any type of legislation through the Com-
merce Clause:
When, therefore, Congress undertakes to enact a law, which can
only be valid as a regulation of commerce, it is reasonable to expect
to find on the face of the law, or from its essential nature, that it is a
regulation of commerce with foreign nations, or among the several
states .... If not so limited, it is in excess of the power of
Congress.163
There is no mention of interstate commerce on the face of § 2319A.164
However, the "essential nature" of § 2319A as a Commerce Clause
regulation is shown by three factors. First, the drafters of § 2319A
intended that Congress enact the legislation through the Commerce
Clause. 165 Second, the statute itself requires that the bootlegs be
made and distributed for the purposes of "commercial gain,' 66 indi-
cating that commercial effects were on the drafters' minds. Finally,
numerous recording industry entities have found that illegal bootleg-
ging substantially affects their business-in other words, interstate
commerce.
167
The Second Circuit next analyzed Heart of Atlanta.168 The Supreme
Court upheld a civil rights statute as validly enacted under Congress's
Commerce Clause power, even though the Court had previously de-
clared a similar statute unconstitutional under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 169 The Second Circuit's assessment of
Heart of Atlanta is consistent with numerous other constitutional chal-
lenges, including Katzenbach v. McClung 70 and Wickard v. Filburn.171
In McClung and Wickard, the Supreme Court allowed Congress to
162. Id. at 147.
163. Kelley v. Great N. Ry., 152 F. 211, 236 (1907).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
165. Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1232 (explaining that the drafters had originally
slated § 2319 to go into Title 15, symbolizing its place among Commerce Clause regulations).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (defining the mens rea for § 2319A as "knowingly and for purposes
of commercial advantage or private financial gain").
167. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152; see also IFPI REPORT, supra note 1, and L.A. REPORT, supra
note 1 (finding that illegal bootlegging and piracy cost the recording industry millions of dollars
every year).
168. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146-47.
169. Id. at 146. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court had previously declared civil
rights legislation unconstitutional. 109 U.S. 3. 10-25 (1883).
170. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
171. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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regulate intrastate activities that affected interstate commerce. 172 Ad-
ditionally, McClung and other Supreme Court cases' 73 support the
Second Circuit's view that the rational basis standard is applicable
when determining whether anti-bootlegging activities under § 2319A
affect interstate commerce. 174 The Second Circuit did not discuss the
recent Supreme Court debate about the level of generality required
for rational basis review of Commerce Clause regulation; 175 however,
most authorities agree that some incarnation of rational basis review
is still the correct standard to apply to interstate commerce laws.176
The Second Circuit also discussed Heart of Atlanta's implications
for Commerce Clause regulation. From Heart of Atlanta, the Second
Circuit concluded that "Congress can regulate under the Commerce
Clause what it could not regulate under an amendment specifically
aimed at the wrong at issue."' 177 The Second Circuit effectively analo-
gized the statutes in Heart of Atlanta and Martignon. In Heart of At-
lanta, the Civil Rights Act, a commercial statute, targeted racial
discrimination, which was at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment;
yet, the Act circumvented the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement
that the state be a participant in discriminatory activities. 178 Similarly,
in Martignon, § 2319A, a commercial statute, targeted the illegal fixa-
tion and distribution of performances. 179 The regulated activity goes
to the core of the Copyright Clause, yet § 2319A circumvented the
172. McClung, 379 U.S. at 305 (holding that Congress could regulate a small business because
its discriminatory activities affected interstate commerce); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 133 (holding that
Congress could regulate one person's activity that did not affect interstate commerce by itself, so
long as the aggregate effect of many similarly situated people affected interstate commerce).
173. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that Congress could regulate
the intrastate activities of a person, so long as Congress has a rational basis to believe that the
activities affect interstate commerce); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding
that violence against women on a college campus was not sufficiently related to interstate com-
merce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a gun control regulation was
not sufficiently related to interstate commerce).
174. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152.
175. Since Lopez, the Court has struggled with the level of generality at which rational basis
review should be applied; something greater than rational basis-"substantial effects"-became
the Supreme Court's benchmark for Commerce Clause regulation. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 153, §3.3.5.
176. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L.
REV. 369 (discussing the Lopez decision's reception by lower courts and indicating that most
lower courts still apply pre-1995 rational basis review, as the Second Circuit did in Martignon).
In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of § 2319A and noted that
§ 2319A passes not only rational basis review, but also the "substantial effects" test of Lopez.
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999).
177. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 147.
178. Id. at 147-48.
179. Id. at 141.
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Copyright Clause requirement that an author receive copyright pro-
tection for a limited time.180
Martignon's interpretation of Heart of Atlanta was inconsistent with
that of the Second Circuit. Martignon argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was at issue in Heart of Atlanta, contains no spe-
cific limitations on Congress's general power to enact legislation. 181
Further, Martignon argued that the "copyright-like" nature of
§ 2319A makes it clear that it "falls squarely within the scope of the
Copyright Clause," thus preventing Congress from enacting it through
other constitutional vehicles. 182 However, the Second Circuit takes a
broader, simpler view of Heart of Atlanta: if Congress could not enact
legislation under one part of the Constitution, it could enact the stat-
ute under the Commerce Clause if the activity was sufficiently related
to interstate commerce. 183
The Second Circuit also analyzed Gibbons, which was an important
case to distinguish from the Martignon facts because the lower court
had heavily relied on Gibbons.184 In Gibbons, the Supreme Court
struck down RITA as "repugnant to ... the Bankruptcy Clause" 185
and, most likely, invalid under Commerce Clause powers.1 86 The Sec-
ond Circuit carefully distinguished Martignon from Gibbons, which
focused on whether RITA was a bankruptcy law or a commercial reg-
ulation. 187 Some scholars support this view, noting that the basis of
the Gibbons analysis was its classification of RITA as a bankruptcy
statute. 8 One commentator explains that "although [the] Martignon
[district court] and KISS I followed [Gibbons's] result, they did not
follow its reasoning closely."' 8 9 Gibbons was concerned with the in-
tegrity of the Bankruptcy Clause, but the integrity of the Copyright
Clause was not likely to be affected by § 2319A.' 90 In its analysis, the
Gibbons court primarily looked to what the regulation accomplished,
"not Congress's belief as to which clause authorized its action."' 91
The court found that RITA was a bankruptcy law, not "bankruptcy-
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. David Patton, The Correct-Like Decision in United States v. Martignon, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1287, 1290 (2006).
183. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 148.
184. Id. at 148-49.
185. Id. at 148 (quoting Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465 (1982)).
186. Id. at 149 (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468-69).
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 53, at 477.
189. Id. at 487.
190. Id. at 487-88.
191. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149.
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like," as § 2319A was "copyright-like.' 92 In this light, the Second
Circuit viewed § 2319A as regulating illegal bootlegging in interstate
commerce.193
Citing Gibbons, some scholars, as well as the district court in Mar-
tignon,t 94 focus on Congress's inability to enact laws through the
Commerce Clause when it could not enact the laws through another
constitutional vehicle.' 95 In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit used the
Gibbons rationale to support Congress's ability to enact § 2319A
through the Commerce Clause' 96 and recognized the tension between
Gibbons and cases like Heart of Atlanta and the Trade-Mark Cases.197
Acknowledging some instances in which Congress may not circum-
vent a clause of the Constitution by enacting legislation through the
Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Circuit claimed that Moghadam was
not such a case:
[T]he Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is positively
forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under other
constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of
authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in
the term "Writings." . . . Extending quasi-copyright protection to
unfixed live musical performances is in no way inconsistent with the
Copyright Clause, even if that Clause itself does not directly author-
ize such protection. 198
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning focused on the limits of the Copy-
right Clause, while the Second Circuit in Martignon focused on Gib-
bons's classification of RITA as a bankruptcy statute, as opposed to a
commercial regulation. 199
192. Id. The Second Circuit's position is supported by one scholar, who criticizes the district
court's use of Gibbons:
Basically, the Railway Labor Executives v. Gibbons analysis was not very persuasive...
because the statute at issue in Gibbons was a bankruptcy statute. There is no question
about it. The statute at issue here-certainly, at least arguably-is not a copyright stat-
ute. It is copyright-like. That is as close as the court will come to saying it is a copy-
right statute. It is copyright-like.
Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1239.
193. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152.
194. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492 F.3d
140 (2d Cir. 2007).
195. See, e.g., Michael F. Finn, "Just the Facts, Ma'am": The Effect of the Supreme Court's
Decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. on the Colorization of Black
and White Films, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 859, 871-72 (1993) ("It seems likely that the same
rationale present in Gibbons would also bar any type of Commerce Clause legislation aimed at
removing limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause."); Patton, supra note 182, at 1291-93.
196. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279-81 (11th Cir. 1999).
197. Id. at 1279.
198. Id. at 1280.
199. Id. at 1280-81.
[Vol. 58:185
UNITED STATES V. MARTIGNON
2. Strength of the Second Circuit's Reasoning
The Second Circuit's reasoning is consistent, clear, and logical. By
evaluating and dismantling the district court's reasoning,200 as well as
drawing its own conclusions, the Second Circuit crafted a convincing
argument for the constitutionality of § 2319A.
The Second Circuit explored the first flaw in the district court's
analysis: its assessment of the legislative history of § 2319A.20 1 The
district court found that Congress meant to enact § 2319A as a copy-
right law because the obligations of the TRIPS agreement were en-
tirely intellectual-property-oriented, as were the definitions of terms
within § 2319A.202 While the TRIPS agreement did direct Congress
to enact a legislative prohibition against commercial bootlegging, the
Second Circuit pointed out that TRIPS signatories were "free to de-
termine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
[TRIPS] within their own legal system and practice. '20 3 In other
words, TRIPS did not require the anti-bootlegging mechanism to be
based in intellectual property law; parties were free to enact the provi-
sions under other legal umbrellas, such as criminal systems. 204
The district court's next explained that § 2319A is "copyright-
like. '205 The Second Circuit correctly refuted this assessment and
concluded that § 2319A could not be a copyright law:
Section 2319A does not create and bestow property rights upon au-
thors or inventors, or allocate those rights among claimants to them.
It is a criminal statute, falling in its codification ... between the law
criminalizing certain copyright infringement and the law criminaliz-
ing "trafficking in counterfeit goods or services." It is, perhaps,
analogous to the law of criminal trespass.20 6
The term "copyright-like," which the district court used liberally in its
analysis, is also far from clear. One scholar noted that commentators
and judges dubbed the term imprecise, nonsensical, "not particularly
200. See Nancy L. Datres, Note & Comment, United States v. Martignon: Court Yanks the
"Power" Plug on the Federal Antibootlegging Law, 15 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y
347, 369 (2005) (noting that "like a line of dominoes [the district court's] flawed logic topples at
the slightest touch").
201. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492
F.3d 140 (2d Cit. 2007).
202. Id. at 420.
203. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 26, art. 1(1)).
204. WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT AND THE GATT: AN INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS AcT 1 (1995).
205. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
206. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 151.
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helpful," or an insufficient basis to strike down the statute.20 7 Addi-
tionally, the drafters of § 2319A did not believe they were drafting
copyright legislation:
If we had thought it was permissible to legislate under the Copy-
right Act, we would have .... Having decided that the Copyright
Clause was limited to fixed works and that the performances in
question were unfixed, we knew that we were not legislating under
the Copyright Act .... But when the Eleventh Circuit said that
Congress thought they were legislating under the Copyright Clause,
I don't get that. We clearly were not. You can say we were wrong
because you disagree with how we interpreted the Constitution, but
to say that we thought we were legislating under the Copyright
Clause is nonsensical. 20 8
Instead, William Patry, congressional staffer and drafter of § 2319A,
claimed that the law was originally set to be codified in Title 15 as
Commerce Clause legislation.20 9 Indeed, as the government noted in
its appeal, "The Commerce Clause grants Congress broad authority to
regulate commercial activity, and the activity in question, selling unau-
thorized recordings of live performances, is plainly commercial.1 21 0
Continuing its the deconstruction of the district court's "copyright-
like" analysis, the Second Circuit noted that, under Gibbons, "in order
to demonstrate unconstitutionality, Martignon must establish that
Section 2319A is a copyright law and not just that it is copyright-
like. ' 211 This line of thinking is supported by the Gibbons's Court's
broad view of the Commerce Clause, which allows Congress to legis-
late to protect "all the external concerns of the nation. ' 212 Some
scholars, however, support the use of the term "copyright-like" as an
expression related to § 2319A and other "quasi-copyright" protections
of authors' works.21 3 One scholar, David Patton, noted that there will
be an increasing amount of copyright-like or quasi-copyright laws as
the United States continues to pass more novel intellectual property
207. Patton, supra note 182, at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted). William Patry, who
drafted § 2319A, agreed: "The idea that it could be 'copyright-like' I don't quite get either. You
are pregnant or you are not pregnant. Either it is a Copyright Clause or it is not a Copyright
Clause. It can't be 'copyright-like."' Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1234.
208. Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1233 (internal citations omitted) (William Patry
speaking). Patry also said that, as a copyright lawyer, his first instinct was to draft § 2319A as
copyright legislation, but the limitations imposed on copyright law by the Copyright Clause
made it clear that such a designation would not be possible. Id.
209. Id. at 1232.
210. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 6.
211. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150.
212. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 8 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196
(1824)).
213. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 182. Patton noted that the district court in Martignon "was
not the first to use the term 'copyright-like,' and [it] will likely not be the last." Id. at 1287.
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statutes.214 Such nontraditional intellectual property laws may rightly
be considered "copyright-like" because "they both regulate in the
field of intellectual property, but do so in ways novel to traditional
American intellectual property legislation. ' 215 Additionally, Patton
noted that new intellectual property laws are more frequently being
passed in response to international treaties, moving the United States
closer to Europe's "neighboring rights" view of intellectual property
and away from the more traditional constitutionally based view. 216
To determine whether § 2319A is a copyright law, the Second Cir-
cuit set out two approaches for examining the Copyright Clause: the
text of the clause and the history and context of the clause. 217 While
the court did not choose which is the better method to use to assess
§ 2319A's status, the court correctly judged that the statute may not
be classified as a copyright law under either method. Though the rea-
soning might be strengthened by dictating that a court must use both
methods to classify § 2319A, the reasoning is nonetheless sound.
Looking to a statute's text, as well as the statute's history and context,
are typical methods of analysis to determine legislative intent for
statutes.21
8
Under the Second Circuit's reasoning, § 2319A may fall under the
Commerce Clause so long as it is not a copyright law. 219 After deter-
mining that that § 2319A was not a copyright law, the Second Circuit
swiftly ruled that § 2319A was "well within the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority. ' 220 The court's brief Commerce Clause
analysis is not surprising because the constitutional level of analysis
for commercial regulations is only rational basis.221 Under this mini-
mal level of scrutiny, two facts are sufficient for the court to conclude
that § 2319A falls under the Commerce Clause: (1) the mention of
"commercial advantage" in § 2319A;222 and (2) the "eminently rea-
sonable" congressional conclusion that the market for bootlegged
records "will have a substantial interstate effect on the sale and distri-
bution of legitimate phonorecords. '' 223 Opponents may criticize the
214. Id. at 1287-88.
215. Id. at 1288.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2007).
218. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, § 1.4 (discussing textualist and contextualist interpre-
tations for the Constitution, statutes, and regulations).
219. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152.
220. Id. at 152-53.
221. Id. at 152 (quoting Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 754
(1982)).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000).
223. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152-53.
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Second Circuit's apparently dismissive attitude, especially the lack of
statistics or evidence cited by the court regarding the effect of unau-
thorized bootlegging on the legal market. However, under rational
basis analysis, it is not necessary to prove that the behavior actually
affects interstate commerce; the court need only find that Congress
reasonably believed the behavior would affect interstate commerce. 224
Few commercial regulations will overcome this presumption of consti-
tutionality. 225 Further, as the Government noted in its brief, the Su-
preme Court does not require "that Congress have actually
considered whether the activity in question impacts . . . interstate
commerce."
226
3. Treatment of Counterarguments
The Second Circuit's treatment of Martignon's claims and other
counterarguments was thorough, though cursory at times. Mar-
tignon's stance is supported by scholarly research and is not unreason-
able.227 The Second Circuit allowed for this in some cases, admitting
that some clauses of the Constitution did apply to other clauses. 228
Further, the Second Circuit conceded that the Copyright Clause itself
is unclear about the scope of power it grants to Congress. 229 Thus,
while the Second Circuit's reasoning might have benefited by more
thoroughly addressing the opponents' arguments, the court ultimately
comes to the correct conclusion.
Aside from the Second Circuit's constitutional precedent, discussed
above,230 the court also addressed Martignon's argument that the lim-
its of the Copyright Clause extend to the regulation of creative works
224. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) (holding that Congress had a rational basis
to enact a law to regulate home-grown marijuana because such activity would affect interstate
commerce).
225. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15
(1976)). Even under the new rational basis standard defined under United States v. Lopez, the
Supreme Court has upheld federal statutes in its two most recent Commerce Clause challenges:
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) and Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003). See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, § 3.3.5.
226. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 10 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
473-75 (1980); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1997); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 1997)).
227. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007)
(No. 04-5649-cr); Brief for Internet Archive et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Ap-
pellee, United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 04-5649-cr); Brief for
Twenty-Nine Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 140; see
Graves, supra note 143.
228. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 144.
229. Id. at 145.
230. See supra notes 148-199 and accompanying text.
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under other Congressional powers. 231 The skeptical Second Circuit
pointed out that Martignon's authority, Graham v. John Deere Co., 232
does not contain such a holding. 233 Ultimately, the Second Circuit is
correct: Graham contains little consideration of the Copyright
Clause's limitations on other Constitutional clauses. Further, the Sec-
ond Circuit noted that the Copyright Clause itself is far from clear
about the limitations placed on "copyright-like" legislation under
other Article 1, Section 8 powers.234 Under the Second Circuit's inter-
pretation, the Graham decision suggests that "the power granted and
the limitations are virtually coterminous. ' 235 The Copyright Clause
may be another area of constitutional law that must be molded by
modern-day lawmakers; the founding fathers could not have envi-
sioned methods of copying that would be as simple as DVD burners,
digital recorders, and other tools. Therefore, Congress should have
the power to protect authors' rights through other constitutional ave-
nues when the Copyright Clause is unavailable.
Further, the Second Circuit noted that Martignon's contentions
were not outrageous-the court simply did not agree.236 For instance,
the Second Circuit acknowledges that Martignon's position on Heart
of Atlanta "may have some logic to support it."'237 This treatment is
far from the flat rejection of other claims by Martignon. In fact, the
applicability of Heart of Atlanta is questioned by the amicus curiae
brief brought on Martignon's behalf by twenty-nine law professors,
who noted that the Heart of Atlanta Supreme Court held that "the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 could not be justified under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but unlike the Copyright Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment contains no limitations precluding such legislation under
another independent authority. '238  The Second Circuit, however,
tackled and dismissed the argument that the Copyright Clause con-
tains express limitations and determined that the limitations of the
231. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 145-46. The limitations on the Copyright Clause are that the
work in question must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and that the copyright vest in
the author for a limited time. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8;
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 145-46.
232. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (holding that the Patent Act of 1952 did
not change the general requirements for patentable inventions and that inventions at issue in the
case were not patentable because they were obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art).
233. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 145.
234. Id. at 145-46.
235. Id. at 146 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 5).
236. Id. at 148.
237. Id.
238. Brief for Twenty-Nine Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors, supra
note 140, at 14.
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Copyright Clause end with copyright laws and do not apply to com-
mercial legislation.239
Additionally, the amicus curiae brief focused on § 2319A's lack of
fixation requirement as evidence of its unconstitutionality. 240 While
Martignon used the lack of fixation requirement to show that § 2319A
did not fall under the scope of the Copyright Clause as copyright legis-
lation, amici curiae argued that the rights of fixation conferred upon
authors by § 2319A-that only the author of a work may fix the work
in a tangible medium of expression-are "indistinguishable from
those provided by copyright law." 24' However, the Second Circuit's
view of the limitations of the Copyright Clause differs from the view
of amici curiae. The Second Circuit supported the constitutionality of
"copyright-like" legislation as operating outside the limits of the Cop-
yright Clause, while amici curiae believed that the Copyright Clause
limits the Commerce Clause-and presumably all other clauses of the
Constitution, as well. 242
B. Normative Consideration of Martignon
The intellectual property community responded forcefully to Mar-
tignon.243 While some scholars were shocked at the lower court's de-
cision, many, possibly a majority, opposed the reasoning in the Second
Circuit's assessment. 244
Congress enacted § 2319A and other anti-bootlegging statutes pur-
suant to international obligations, and, as such, the United States is
bound by the law of treaties to implement the legislation. 245 Interna-
tional pressures should encourage the United States to make treaty
compliance a priority.246 However, some scholars expressed frustra-
239. See supra notes 100-134 and accompanying text.
240. Brief for Twenty-Nine Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors, supra
note 140, at 15-20.
241. Id. at 21.
242. See supra notes 100-134 & 238 and accompanying text.
243. Patry, who drafted § 2319A, said, "I never expected any statute I wrote to be held uncon-
stitutional and certainly not by second-year law students." Martignon Symposium, supra note
29, at 1225.
244. See Graves, supra note 143, at 218 ("Despite the careful wording of the Moghadam opin-
ion, the majority of scholars who have considered the issue have come to the conclusion that its
central holding-that Congress can do under the Commerce Clause what it cannot do under the
Copyright Clause-is incorrect."). See, e.g., id. at 218 n.119 (noting a long list of authorities
opposed to the idea that Congress could legislate around the Copyright Clause by using the
broader authority granted in the Commerce Clause). See generally Patton, supra note 182.
245. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
246. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in Missouri v. Holland: "It is obvious that there
may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well-being that an act of Congress could
not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could ...." 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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tion at the district court's Martignon decision, pointing out that the
district court's assessment made it impossible for the United States to
uphold its treaty obligations under the URAA. 247 Commentators
have indicated that there may have been other ways to validate
§ 2319A other than through the Commerce Clause. For example, one
commentator suggested that Congress could have enacted § 2319A
through the Treaty Power.248 Criticizing the district court's holding,
this view posits that "the treaty power of the Necessary and Proper
Clause provides Congress with the power to do things pursuant to rat-
ification of an international agreement that it has no Article I power
whatsoever to do."' 249 If the enforcement of a treaty conflicts with
defined constitutional rights, the treaty would be unenforceable. 250
However, in the case of Martignon, there is no constitutional right to
create and sell unauthorized bootlegs of musical performances, so the
flexible Treaty Power would likely support Congress's ability to enact
§ 2319A.251
On the other hand, other commentators express skepticism that
§ 2319A and other such "copyright-like" legislation might be enacted
through the Treaty Power.252 These scholars view the Treaty Power as
more limited under Reid v. Covert.253 In Reid, the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute on the basis of a conflict with the Bill of
Rights. 254 One author noted that "we can now say with confidence
that the Treaty Power, at least in the domain of individual rights-the
setting of Reid v. Covert-is subject to the Constitution's other limita-
tions. '255 These scholars interpret Reid as a more serious limitation of
Congress's power to enact legislation pursuant to its Treaty Power.
Enacting criminal sanctions to protect intangible property rights,
such as copyright, makes sense in many ways. Copyright, like other
247. Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1245-46.
248. Id. at 1244. This commentator, Bob Clarida, drafted a brief to this effect on behalf of the
RIAA during litigation of Martignon in the lower court. Brief for UMG Recordings et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir.
2007) (No. 04-5649-cr).
249. Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1244.
250. Id. at 1245 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) as an example of a treaty that was
held to be unenforceable on the basis of a conflict with constitutional rights).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Graves, supra note 143, at 224-25 (citing Robert Anderson IV, "Ascertained in a
Different Way": The Treaty Power at the Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189 (2001)).
253. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
254. Id. at 21 ("Having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of Clause 14.").
255. Graves, supra note 143, at 224-25 (quoting Anderson, supra note 252, at 192).
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intellectual property rights, is a valuable commodity.256 As shown by
industry reports, the U.S. entertainment industry generates billions of
dollars per year in revenue, concert ticket sales, and licensing rights,
and conversely loses billions per year to piracy and bootlegging.25 7
Naturally, the criminal law has emerged as one of the strongest candi-
dates to protect the owners of such valuable rights.258 While civil rem-
edies exist for plaintiffs who seek to recover lost profits and rights
from bootleggers,259 the criminal law offers other advantages, such as
deterrence of future bootleggers. Further, in criminal cases, the gov-
ernment foots the bill for litigation, which many artists may not be
able to do in civil court; in this way, criminal prosecution offers pro-
tection for an artist's work free of charge to the artist.260 Thus, the
Second Circuit's reasoning in Martignon serves artists' interests, as
well as the United States' interest in complying with its treaties
abroad. Martignon's normative implications are therefore positive for
the entertainment industry, which generates billions of dollars in the
U.S. economy every year.261
V. IMPACT
In Martignon, the Second Circuit supported the existing body of law
in several important ways. In the realm of copyright law, Martignon
upheld "copyright-like" protection for authors through criminal sanc-
tions.262 With regard to the Commerce Clause, Martignon continued
down the path set by previous cases: Congress may do indirectly what
it could not do directly through another constitutional avenue.
263
A. Copyright Clause Ramifications of Martignon
Many scholars are averse to enacting protection for copyright own-
ers through constitutional vehicles other than the Copyright Clause. 264
While this school of thought seeks to prevent Congress from enacting
laws that fail the requirements of copyright law, the effect of such a
hard-and-fast rule would leave copyright owners without protection
256. See generally Moohr, supra note 32.
257. See IFPI REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (estimating that losses to the music industry from
digital theft, including piracy and bootlegging, run in billions of dollars per year).
258. See generally Moohr, supra note 32.
259. The civil remedy against bootleggers is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
260. See Brief for UMG Recordings, supra note 248, at 6-9.
261. See IFPI REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
262. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2007).
263. Id. at 152.
264. See supra note 143 for some examples of scholars who disagree with Martignon's Com-
merce Clause holding.
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for their work when civil remedies fail. Martignon and similar cases
have correctly allowed Congress to open the door for copyright pro-
tection through other constitutional avenues, recognizing that U.S.
treaty obligations and the importance of authors' rights mandate pro-
tection beyond what has been offered in the past.265
Martignon supports the idea that Congress can create copyright-like
laws that do not comply with the requirements of the Copyright
Clause, namely fixation and copyright expiration.266 This significantly
impacts copyright law, because it signifies that even works that are
unfixed (i.e. concert performances) will receive some copyright pro-
tection.267 The unfixed works will benefit from the deterrent effect
that the criminal statute will have on bootleggers. 268
Specifically, some scholars have noted that criminal protection
against unauthorized fixation of an author's expression has a stifling
effect on the public domain. 269 For example, the American Associa-
tion of Law Libraries wrote an amicus curiae brief in support of af-
firming the lower court's opinion, because allowing unauthorized
fixation "leads to the preservation and dissemination of our cultural
heritage," which "ensures that this cultural heritage is available to fu-
ture generations. '270 Others agree, noting examples of early unautho-
rized music recordings that provided insight into music of the past.2 71
One author even calls bootleggers "the custodians of vocal history. '272
However, by finding § 2319A constitutional, the Martignon court rec-
ognizes an author's right to decide whether his work should be made
available to the public in fixed recordings. As such, the case is strong
support for the proprietary rights of authors in their works.
B. Commerce Clause Ramifications of Martignon
Recent constitutional disputes regarding Congress's Commerce
Clause power support the idea that Congress may legislate through
the Commerce Clause in spite of the limitations of other provisions of
265. See Dinwoodie, supra note 108, at 357-58.
266. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152.
267. See Patterson, supra note 4, at 402 ("After decades of piracy and the relatively recent
proliferation of bootlegging, the general consensus in the international community is that a more
effective remedy under individual nations' intellectual property law should be sought through a
new mechanism." (citing CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 1004 (3d ed. 1994))).
268. Id.
269. Brief of Internet Archive, supra note 227, at 12-23.
270. Id. at 13.
271. See HEYLIN, supra note 1, at 1-21 (noting examples of recordings that preserved vital
music history, including Bob Dylan's "Great White Wonder" album and early recordings of jazz
musicians).
272. Id. at 22.
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the Constitution.273 Thus, Martignon adds to the line of precedent
that has determined that Congress may legislate through the Com-
merce Clause, even when Congress could not legislate through other
constitutional mechanisms.
The intersection of copyright law and Commerce Clause litigation is
likely to increase as digital bootlegging and piracy become easier and
more widespread. Martignon adds another point of law to that in-
creasingly widening constellation: Congress may enact "copyright-
like" legislation through the Commerce Clause, if it is sufficiently dis-
tinct from copyright law such that the law is not connected to a copy-
right holder's property rights.274
Finally, because the constitutional challenges to civil and criminal
anti-bootlegging statutes have unanimously determined that Congress
had the ability to enact "copyright-like" statutes through the Com-
merce Clause, 275 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will hear the
case. With Martignon as another brick in the wall, this area of law
now appears more solid than before, encouraging more circuits to fol-
low the reasoning in KISS, Moghadam, and Martignon.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Martignon decision conflicts with some scholarly opinion
about the limitations of the Commerce Clause, it is supported by
other federal courts that have upheld the constitutionality of the anti-
bootlegging statutes, including the KISS cases and Moghadam.276
Also, the Martignon decision has helped the U.S. adhere to its treaty
obligations and keep pace with international copyright law. 277
The digitalization of the entertainment industry has meant that it is
easier than ever for bootleggers to record, copy, and distribute artists'
music. 278 Copyright protection should not diminish merely because it
cannot keep up with technology. Instead, copyright protection in the
United States must keep pace with protection abroad, even if Con-
gress must legislate through nontraditional means.279 If Congress
finds that criminal sanctions will deter bootleggers from recording,
273. See supra notes 73-141 and accompanying text.
274. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2007).
275. See supra notes 53-141 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
277. See Martignon Symposium, supra note 29, at 1226.
278. See generally IFPI REPORT, supra note 1.
279. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 17.01[A] ("We have now reached the stage where
'internationalization is an integral component of U.S. copyright lawmaking."' (citing Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U.
PA. L. REv. 469, 483 (2000))).
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distributing, and selling unauthorized recordings of performances,
then that finding is entitled to the same deference as other criminal
provisions. Criminal sanctions' effect on bootleggers will be known in
time; until then, bootleggers are on notice as to the gravity of their
crimes.
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